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Report on a technical policy seminar
Over the past year, the debt crisis in Europe and the United States (US) has
prompted many policymakers to seek options for reducing government
expenditures. Some are concerned that expanding elderly populations will
increase fiscal pressure on government-sponsored pension and healthcare systems.
Such concerns have prompted a consideration of pension and healthcare reforms,
including changes in the retirement age.
In other regions of the world, policymakers will face challenges of expanding
elderly populations in a more difficult context—with weaker financial institu-
tions and at lower levels of economic development. Although economists and
policymakers differ in their views on the fiscal consequences of population aging,
many would agree that one of the most important public-policy challenges of
this century is to provide pensions and healthcare for rapidly growing elderly
populations without placing unacceptable burdens on other age groups or
jeopardizing economic growth.
On 19–20 September 2011, the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)
and the East-West Center (EWC) held a Technical Policy Seminar on the
Economics of Aging. The seminar was designed to assess: (1) the role of the
public sector in an aging and uncertain world; (2) the implications of population
aging for social, economic, and population policy; and (3) remaining gaps in
knowledge that need to be addressed.
In opening the seminar, Werner Haug emphasized that developing economies
facing the fiscal and institutional challenges associated with population aging
will have a very short timeframe in which to act. Some leaders have turned to
the United Nations (UN) for assistance in formulating appropriate programs
and policies, and UNFPA is currently working to develop a shared under-
standing of the economic and fiscal consequences of population aging and
to map out a coherent response. The technical policy seminar was designed







Populations are becoming older, with
fewer children and more elderly, in every
region of the world. This process of
population aging is primarily the result
of fertility decline. Over the past 40 years,
total fertility rates (average number of
births per woman) have gone down in
all the world’s most populous regions
(Figure 1). In Africa, Asia, and Latin
America, this trend is expected to continue
over the next 40 years. Increasingly in
these economies and in the highly
developed economies where fertility is
already low, gains in life expectancy are
also contributing to population aging.
Today, in roughly half the world’s
economies, the population at working age is
growing more quickly, in absolute numbers,
than the population of children or the
elderly. This creates a potentially favorable
age structure for economic growth.
Among the economies covered by the
National Transfer Accounts (NTA) project,
this demographic process has hardly started
in Nigeria. In 2010–15, the United Nations
estimates Nigeria’s total fertility at 5.4 children
per woman and life expectancy at birth
at 53 years (United Nations Secretariat
2010). High fertility and low rates of
infant and child mortality result in a very
young population, with 43 percent in the
working-age group of 20–64, compared
with 53 percent age 0–19 and only 3
percent at age 65 and above (Figure 2a).
By contrast, the process of population
aging is well underway in Brazil, with a
total fertility rate in 2010–15 at 1.8
children per woman and life expectancy
at birth at 74 years. Fifty-nine percent of
Brazil’s population is in the working-age
group, compared with only 34 percent
age 0–19 and 7 percent age 65 and above
(Figure 2b).
The other half of the world—living in
Europe, North America, and East Asia—
has completed this phase of the demo-
graphic transition. In these societies, high
life expectancies have combined with
low—and in some cases very low—birth
rates to change the age structure of
populations still further. Often surprisingly
quickly, these populations will come to
consist of very few children, not many
workers, and many old people.
Japan exemplifies this stage of
demographic change, with total fertility
in 2010–15 estimated at only 1.4 children
























Figure 2a. Age and sex structure of the population of Nigeria, 2010.
Source: United Nations Secretariat 2010.

























Figure 2b. Age and sex structure of the population of brazil, 2010.



































Figure 1. Total fertility rates in major regions of the world, 1970, 1990, and 2010.
Source:Mauricio Soto, presentation at the Technical Policy Seminar on the Economics of Aging.

























Figure 2c. Age and sex structure of the population of Japan, 2010.
Source: United Nations Secretariat 2010.
segment of the population is centenarians—
over the past 50 years, the 100+ age group
has grown at an annual rate of 13 percent.
Why does population
age structure matter?
Changes in the age structure of a population
assume economic importance because of a
fundamental feature of the economic life-
cycle—working-age adults produce more
through their labor than they consume,
while children and the elderly consume
more than they produce. This economic
pattern is only possible because resources
flow over time and across generations
through a complex system of social,
economic, and political institutions.
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Figure 3. Percentage of total population under age 15 and age 65 and above
in major regions of the world, 2010 and projected for 2030 and 2050.
Source: United Nations Secretariat 2010.
per woman and life expectancy at 84.
Fifty-two percent of Japan’s population is
in the working-age group, while only 18
percent are young, and 23 percent are
elderly (Figure 2c).
Over the next 40 years, populations
will become older in all the most popu-
lous regions of the world (Figure 3). In
Africa, Asia, and Latin America, the pro-
portion under age 20 will decline, and the
proportion age 65 and above will increase,
although there is considerable variation
within Asia. In Europe and Northern
America, the proportion of children is
already small, but the proportion of elderly
will increase. This shift in the relative size of
population age groups is occurring and will
continue to occur at unprecedented speed.
In Japan, for example, the fastest-growing
In the past, the main challenge was to
provide for the resource needs of children
because they were such a large component
of the population. This is still the case in
many low- and middle-income economies.
As populations age, meeting the resource
needs of the elderly becomes more challeng-
ing. In many economies today, however,
populations have become increasingly
concentrated in the prime working ages—
the period of life during which more is
being produced than consumed. This has
potentially favorable implications for
standards of living and economic growth.
Conventional analysis of the economic
implications of population aging relies
on fixed age groups that often classify
dependents as those under age 15 or age 65
and above. This is a useful starting point,
but Ronald Lee and Andrew Mason
presented the alternative NTA approach.
NTA recognizes variations in the extent of
dependency among people of different
ages by examining actual labor income
and consumption for each one-year age
group.
Labor income is a broad measure that
reflects variation across age in labor force
participation, unemployment rates, hours
worked, and wages. NTA defines labor
income comprehensively to include the
value of most productive work: the earn-
ings of employees, employer-provided
benefits, taxes paid to the government by
employers on behalf of employees, the
proportion of entrepreneurial income that
is a return to labor, and the estimated
value of unpaid family labor.
Consumption in NTA includes goods
and services from both public and private
sources. Separate estimates of public and
private consumption are constructed for
every NTA economy in three categories—
education, health, and other goods and
services. This provides comprehensive
estimates of human-capital spending by
age for economies at widely varying levels
of development—estimates that are not
available from other sources.
One current shortcoming is that NTA
estimates of labor income do not include
the value of time associated with child-
rearing and other at-home activities that
do not produce market goods or services.
As a consequence, women’s labor is not
fully documented, and consumption and
transfers of nonmarket goods and services
are undervalued. NTA researchers are
currently exploring how to incorporate
the value of these elements more fully.
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Keeping in mind these limitations, the
NTA approach reveals remarkably similar
patterns among economies at widely
different stages of economic development.
In India and Germany, for example, per
capita consumption exceeds labor income
for two long periods of life (Figure 4).
These bracket a surprisingly short period—
little more than 30 years—during which
more is being produced than consumed.
Striking differences occur, however,
when population age structure is com-
bined with per capita values to estimate
consumption and labor income for an
economy as a whole. The lifecycle deficit,
defined as consumption in excess of labor
income, is particularly high for the young
in India and for the old in Germany
(Figure 5). The extraordinary differences
between India and Germany are driven
primarily by differences in population age
structure, with many children in India
and many old people in Germany. In
addition, in high-income economies such
as Germany, the elderly tend to consume
a great deal of healthcare, reinforcing the
effect of the population age structure.
The age patterns of consumption and
labor income that make up the economic
lifecycle reflect the goals, institutions,
economic conditions, social consensus, and
policies that are unique to each society at
each point in time. Societies differ, for
example, in how much education they
provide to children and how much they
spend on the healthcare needs of their
elderly. They differ in the age at which
young people enter the labor force and the
success of their transition into productive
employment. They differ in attitudes and
policies concerning retirement, and they
differ in levels of disability at old age.
Perhaps the most important genera-
tional feature of any economy is the
resource flows between age groups that
underlie the economic lifecycle. As with
the age pattens of consumption and labor
income, these flows are influenced by the
unique features of each society. But for each
age group in any society, the gap between
consumption and labor income must equal
the total of three resource flows: (1) net
private transfers that occur primarily within
families plus (2) net public transfers that
occur through government taxes and
programs plus (3) asset-based reallocations
that include the use of asset income plus
any dis-saving or selling off of assets.
Estimates of the relative importance
of private transfers, public transfers, and
assets, available from the NTA website
(www.ntaccounts.org), provide important
insights into changing social patterns and
the effects of public policy. Both families
and governments may support the young
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Figure 5b. Aggregate labor income and consumption
by age in Germany, 2003.
Source:Mason and Lee 2011.
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Figure 5a. Aggregate labor income and consumption
by age in India, 2004.
















Figure 4b. Per capita labor income and consumption
by age in Germany, 2003.


















Figure 4a. Per capita labor income and consumption
by age in India, 2004.
Source:Mason and Lee 2011.
in both cases the support comes primarily
from working-age adults. Families are
generally the primary institution support-
ing children. The role of families in old-
age support is more varied—very often,
older family members provide more
support to the young than they receive.
Governments at the local, regional,
and national level play an important
role by imposing taxes, most heavily on
working-age adults, and providing benefits
to all age groups, but particularly to the
young and the old. Education, pensions,
and healthcare are important examples of
public programs that transfer resources
between age groups.
In addition to relying on income from
their labor and from transfers, people
fund their own consumption and the
support they provide to others through
income earned from assets and, in some
cases, from spending down their savings.
They may accumulate assets during their
working lives or acquire assets through
gifts or bequests, most often from family
members.
Support systems for children and the
elderly vary widely, and these systems
have changed a great deal over time. In
traditional settings in the past, children
relied on their families and perhaps their
villages for support. Children also often
began working at early ages, and the
elderly often worked and supported
themselves until they died. The role of
assets is less clearly understood, but the
accumulation of capital in the form of
housing, farms, and other businesses
produced returns that helped support all
family members. In such situations,
governments could play a useful role by
maintaining the security of assets and
providing an efficient and equitable legal
environment, but they provided very
limited direct support to children or the
elderly.
With social modernization and eco-
nomic development, support systems have
changed in two ways: Public transfers to
children have become more important,
primarily in the form of education, and
family transfers to the elderly have
diminished. In some economies today,
the elderly rely to a great extent on large-
scale public transfer systems. In other
economies, they depend much more on
assets accumulated over their lifetimes.
Brazil and Mexico illustrate common
patterns but also reveal some striking
differences (Figure 6). In both economies,
families provide most of the consumption
needs of children through private transfers.
And in both, the elderly provide more
resources to their families than they receive,
at least up to their mid-80s. But in Brazil,
the elderly receive much larger public
transfers than do the elderly in Mexico,
primarily in the form of pension benefits.
Brazilians become net beneficiaries of public
transfers at age 52, while Mexicans pay
more in taxes than they receive in public
benefits until age 58. And throughout old
age, Brazilians receive significant pension
income. The elderly in Mexico continue
to work longer than the elderly in Brazil
and tend to support themselves largely
through asset income.
The key point from such an analysis
is that both population age structure and
the special features of the economic life-
cycle in each society have important eco-
nomic and policy implications. An analysis
of all these factors helps provide a basis for
understanding how policy might influence
the relationship between age structure and





















Public transfers Private transfers Asset-based reallocations
Figure 6a. Per capita public and private transfers and asset-based resource
flows by age in brazil, 1996.
Source: Calculated from data on the NTAwebsite (www.ntaccounts.org).
Note: Negative values for net public and private transfers occur when an age group is giving more
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Figure 6b. Per capita public and private transfers and asset-based resource
flows by age in mexico, 2004.
Source: Calculated from data on the NTAwebsite (www.ntaccounts.org).
Note: Negative values for net public and private transfers occur when an age group is giving more
than it is receiving.
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Population aging
and the macro economy
NTA measures the direct effect of popula-
tion age structure on economic growth in
terms of the support ratio—the effective
number of producers relative to the effective
number of consumers. The effective number
of producers is the sum of the population
in each one-year age group weighted to
incorporate estimated age differences in
labor force participation, hours worked,
unemployment, and productivity. The
effective number of consumers is the
population in each age group weighted
to incorporate age differences in
consumption.
The support ratio changes in a
systematic way over the demographic
transition. China’s support ratio, for
example, declined between 1950 and the
early 1970s because high fertility resulted
in large numbers of children (Figure 7).
Since then, the support ratio has risen
sharply with a steep drop in fertility,
providing an impetus for economic
growth. Within a few years, however,
China’s support ratio is expected to
decline again as a larger share of the
population reaches old age.
Studies of changes in the support
ratio in East Asia provide evidence that
favorable changes in age structure have
contributed to the region’s economic
success (Bloom and Williamson 1998;
Mason 2001). Other studies have shown
that a rise in the support ratio has led to
higher per capita income in a wide range
of developing economies (Bloom and
Canning 2001; Kelley and Schmidt
2001).
Over the next 20 years, many
developing economies will experience
very significant increases in their support
ratios—throughout Africa and in many
economies of Latin America and South
and Southeast Asia (Table 1). For these
economies, policymakers will face two
broad challenges. The first is to insure
that the increase in the potential work-
force leads to greater employment in
productive jobs. The second is a longer-
term issue—to prepare for the day when
the support ratio declines and expansion
of the elderly population becomes the
dominant demographic trend. Support
ratios in Latin America, for example, are
projected to decline after 2030, falling to
lower levels in 2050 than they were in
2010.
In other economies, where the support
ratio has reached its peak or has already
begun to decline, policymakers also face
two challenges. The first is how best to
sustain economic growth when the number
of workers is declining relative to other age
groups. For some economies, the drag on
growth from a declining support ratio
could be substantial. For example, between
2010 and 2050, China is projected to
experience a net annual decline in its
support ratio (Figure 7) that will depress
annual per capita growth by 0.4 percent
in the absence of offsetting changes.
The second challenge is how to
sustain or reform public programs that
address the needs of growing elderly
populations. The support ratios for Japan,
Germany, South Korea, and Spain, for
example, will decline by an annual average
of 0.65 percent or more over the next four
decades. Other things being equal, the
resources available from taxpayers are clearly
posed to rise more slowly than the support
needed by children and the elderly.
Although several studies have shown
that favorable changes in population age
structure can contribute to economic
Figure 7. changes in the support ratio in china, 1950–2050.
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Figure 8. change in labor share of income in seven european economies
over the past two decades.
Source:Michael Herrmann, presentation at the Technical Policy Seminar on the Economics of Aging,
based on data provided by M. Charpe and R.Torres, International Institute for Labor Studies, International
Labor Organization (ILO).
growth, the links between the size of the
working-age population and a robust
economy are far from automatic. Indeed,
many economies have been unable to
achieve strong economic growth even
with favorable changes in the support
ratio (Mason 2005).
As Michael Herrmann pointed out
during the technical policy seminar, an
increase in the working-age population
does not necessarily lead to an increase
in employment. In fact, average labor
productivity—the amount produced per
worker—is a far more important compo-
nent of total output than the size of the
labor force per se. To meet the challenges
of population aging, policymakers need to
ensure that growing working-age popula-
tions are supported by robust employment
rates and rising labor productivity.
Understanding the role of demographic
change, employment rates, and labor pro-
ductivity can help shed light on several
important policy issues: (1) why the
demographic dividend has been larger in
some economies than in others; (2) how
policies can build on expanding working-
age populations to achieve economic
growth; and (3) what policies might reduce
adverse economic effects when the relative
size of the working-age population begins
to decline.
During the seminar, Heiner Flassbeck
stressed the importance of maintaining
strong economic growth and robust
employment rates throughout the demo-
graphic transition. Potential economic
gains will only be realized if growth in the
working-age population is accompanied
by growth in the number employed.
Eventually, as pension and healthcare
costs rise with expanding elderly popula-
tions, workers may have to set aside as much
as 25 percent of their wages to support
their old age. They will only be willing to
do this if wages are rising and if they feel
confident that the funds they set aside
today will be available, with appreciation, in
the future.
Michael Herrmann observed that
labor income in many advanced
economies has remained stagnant or gone
down in recent years relative to the return
on capital (Figure 8). If economic growth
is stagnant and unemployment or under-
employment is high, as is the case today
in many economies, workers will be un-
willing or unable to set aside funds for
current retirees or to save for their own
retirement.
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Source: Calculated from data on the NTAwebsite (www.ntaccounts.org).
Note: The effective number of producers sums the population in each one-year age group, weighted to
incorporate age differences in employment and productivity estimated for the base year. The effective
number of consumers sums the population in each one-year age group, weighted to incorporate age
differences in consumption estimated for the base year.
Support Ratios
(effective number of producers
per 100 effective consumers)
Region and Economy Base Year 2010 2030 2050
Africa 66 75 86
Kenya (KE) 1994 63 71 79
Nigeria (NG) 2004 69 79 93
east Asia 88 80 68
China (CN) 2002 89 82 75
Japan (JP) 2004 78 71 60
South Korea (KR) 2000 94 84 71
Taiwan (TW) 1998 93 84 65
South and Southeast Asia 92 96 95
India (IN) 2004 92 100 100
Indonesia (ID) 2005 97 103 99
Philippines (PH) 1999 83 91 94
Thailand (TH) 2004 97 90 85
Latin America 90 92 86
Brazil (BR) 1996 84 87 78
Chile (CL) 1997 94 91 85
Costa Rica (CR) 2004 93 95 87
Mexico (MX) 2004 95 100 94
Uruguay (UY) 2006 85 87 85
europe & uS 84 75 69
Austria (AT) 2000 90 77 70
Finland (FI) 2004 82 73 71
Germany (DE) 2003 83 70 63
Hungary (HU) 2005 86 82 73
Slovenia (SI) 2004 76 64 56
Spain (ES) 2000 90 79 67
Sweden (SE) 2003 78 72 69
United States (US) 2003 89 82 81
Table 1. Support ratios for 23 economies, 2010 and projected for 2030 and 2050.
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Population aging and employment
Changes in population age structure over
the demographic transition strongly
influence the potential supply of labor
relative to the population as a whole.
Changes in the size of the working-age
population do not necessarily lead to
corresponding changes in the employed
workforce, however, because of fluctua-
tions in labor-force participation rates and
hours worked. Much of the discussion in
the policy seminar addressed how policy
and non-demographic factors influence
levels of employment.
The most direct link between age
structure and the supply of labor is labor-
force participation, which, in large part,
reflects decisions to enter or to leave the
labor market. These decisions are influenced
by factors such as employment conditions
and the availability of jobs, educational
needs and opportunities, attitudes towards
female employment, and policies and
practices regarding older workers.
Labor-force participation depends
largely on three important demographic
groups: the young, women, and the
elderly. The young are affected by
policies and practices that determine the
age at entry into the labor force—policies
and practices that vary widely. In low-
income economies, young people tend
to enter the labor force at early ages, but
their earnings are often very low. In the
long term, many economies would
probably benefit more if young people
could delay their entrance into the labor
force and continue their education.
Today, large numbers of young adults
in both low- and high-income economies
are neither in school nor productively
employed. This problem is particularly
pronounced because of the current
economic downturn, but youth unemploy-
ment and underemployment appear to be
a more systemic, long-term problem in
many economic settings. Steps to improve
employment rates for young people
include job-training programs and other
interventions intended to increase their
employability, as well as policies that
promote economic growth, job creation,
and new employment opportunities.
Women are the second group with a
strong influence on overall labor-force
participation. Many economies have
seen rapid increases in female labor-force
participation in recent decades, facilitated
in part by lower rates of childbearing.
Policies that enable women to remain in
the labor force while they raise children
include maternity and childcare leave and
assistance with childcare through daycare
centers, after-school programs, or monetary
support for childcare at home.
The third group that influences over-
all labor-force participation rates consists
of older workers. Today, many economies
have mandatory retirement ages that
curtail work in the formal sector, while
others have pension and tax systems that
create incentives for workers to retire early
(Gruber and Wise 1999). For older people
who are healthy, Rob Vos stressed the
potential value of lifelong learning and
other programs that encourage active
participation in the labor force and in the
broader community.
One of the major points of discussion
among policy analysts is whether increased
flexibility in employment practices, in-
cluding job sharing and part-time work,
could increase labor-force participation,
particularly for women and older workers.
Current policies in some economies make
it difficult for women to continue in the
workforce after they have children. Seniority-
based wage systems make it expensive for
firms to retain older workers, and policies
that make it difficult for employers to reduce
their workforce when economic conditions
are unfavorable may discourage them
from adding jobs when times are good.
Even with supportive policies, retire-
ment for many older workers is less a matter
of choice and more a consequence of the
natural decline in ability and the rise in
specific disabilities that come with aging.
David Canning sounded an optimistic
note by pointing to the improvements in
health that will allow adults to work to an
older age in many economies. Naohiro
Ogawa was more cautious. While pointing
to dramatic improvements in life expectancy,
he observed that it remains an open
question whether the elderly in Japan
and other East Asian economies are also
enjoying more years of good health.
For the elderly who remain healthy,
working longer will only be an attractive
option if they are productive and are
earning wages that are commensurate
with their level of productivity. Young
and old workers and women often earn
low wages, even when they work fulltime.
Sang-Hyop Lee showed that older
workers in many economies tend to have
low productivity and earn low wages. As
would be expected, working longer has a
larger effect on income in economies where
older workers earn relatively high wages.
This is the case in most European eco-
nomies. In Mexico, by contrast, in 2004
36 percent of people age 65–75 were still
in the labor force, but their average wages
were low. Raising the average retirement
age in this situation does not have a large
effect on the financial resources available
to the elderly. Ryan Edwards pointed out
that, within a single economy, there are
strong individual-level differences in deci-
sions about when to leave the workforce,
often related to social-economic class.
Many of the policy options discussed
during the seminar addressed the issue of
labor supply under conditions of population
aging, particularly by enabling older people
to choose to work. Michael Herrmann
noted that in a situation of high unemploy-
ment, raising the retirement age will expand
the working-age population but not
necessarily the number of fully employed
workers. This naturally leads to the
question of whether the real problem for
groups with low employment rates might
be the availability of jobs—the demand
for labor rather than the supply. Certainly,
economies experience periods, such as the
present, during which many people who
want to work cannot find employment. In
such a situation, policies that encourage or
facilitate an increase in the supply of labor
are unlikely to have a favorable effect.
Heiner Flassbeck and Detlef Kotte
emphasized the importance of maintaining
consumer demand to support both
immediate economic recovery and long-
term employment growth. Austerity
measures designed to reduce debt and
increase saving rates are, from their
perspective, exactly the wrong approach
for dealing with both the current eco-
nomic crisis and the longer-term issues
of population aging and employment.
Population aging and investment
in human and physical capital
Policies that encourage economic growth,
higher productivity, and higher income for
workers are key components of any success-
ful response to population aging. Today,
economic recovery and restoring full
employment are essential, but in the longer
term, investment in health and education and
in infrastructure and other physical capital
will be key factors in raising labor produc-
tivity and accelerating economic growth.
Investment in child health
and education
Increased spending on children’s health
and education has been one of the most
important benefits of population aging.
In low-fertility economies, human-capital
spending on each child is about four times
the average annual labor income of a
prime-age (30–49) adult, while in high-
fertility economies human-capital spending
per child is only about twice the average
annual labor income of this age group
(Figure 9). As the process of population
aging progresses and working-age popula-
tions become smaller relative to the
number of elderly retirees, increasing
human capital spending is one of the most
promising strategies available to offset the
anticipated decline in the support ratio.
With greater spending on the health and
education of children, future generations
of workers should be more productive,
even if there are fewer of them.
Although education is essential,
programs that focus on child health are
also important. In stressing the economic
benefits of investing in children’s health,
David Canning reported that malaria
prevention and vaccination against measles
and tetanus produce long-term gains in
education and lifetime earnings. Improved
nutrition in early childhood has similar
benefits.
Investment in adult health
Investment in adult health can have an
important influence on worker productivity
and economic growth. Health affects
worker absenteeism, educational perform-
ance, and the acquisition of skills. And
disability and physical decline affect
decisions to leave the workforce as well
as the productivity of those who remain
employed.
Investments that maintain health
at older ages also provide important eco-
nomic benefits. Labor-force participation
and wages do not decline just because
people are older, but also because older
people have declining health and rising
rates of disability. These trends lead to
greater needs for healthcare and long-term
care. To the extent that the link between
age and health can be altered—allowing
for healthy aging—some of the adverse
effects of population aging will be moder-
ated. If poor health (morbidity) can be
compressed to the last years of life, the
prospects for delaying retirement and




The health status of older adults
has important implications for the
economic impact of population
aging. Elderly people who are
healthy incur fewer healthcare
costs and are more likely to
remain in the workforce.
Trends in health status and
levels of disability have been
studied extensively in the United
States (US) and more recently in
other high-income economies.
In the 1970s, disability levels in
various age groups in the US
appeared static, but from the
mid-1980s to the early 2000s,
disability appeared to be declining
for all but the oldest age groups.
Over the past 10 years, how-
ever, the picture has become
more complex. Disability rates in
the US have continued to decline
among those 85 and older, but
they have been relatively flat for
those 65–84, and appear to be
rising modestly for those 55–64
(Freedman et al. 2011). Rising
disability rates in the working-age
population appear to be associ-
ated with increasing obesity
(Battacharya et al. 2008).
The evidence from other
economies paints a mixed picture.
Recent studies concluded that
during the 1990s activities-of-
daily-living (ADL) disability rates
went down in Denmark, Finland,
Italy, and the Netherlands but
went up in Belgium, Japan, and
Sweden (Lafortune et al. 2007;
Robine et al. 2008).
December 2011 9
Figure 9. Trade-off between fertility and human capital spending.
Source:Mason and Lee 2011.
Note: Human capital spending is total spending per child given per capita health spending at age 0–17
and per capita education spending at age 0–24 in the base year. To enable meaningful comparisons,
human capital spending is expressed as a percentage of the average annual labor income of prime-age
(30–49) adults in each economy. See Table 1 for country designations. Light blue dots are for Asia; dark
blue dots are for Latin America; light green dots are for Europe and the US; and dark green dots are for
Africa.
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Investment in physical capital
Although participants in the seminar
agreed on the importance of productive
investment in promoting economic growth,
they did not agree on the relationship
between investment and saving. Ronald
Lee and Andrew Mason contended that as
populations age, households will prefer to
increase the amount of assets they hold in
order to meet their retirement needs. This
response will be strongest in economies
where the elderly rely heavily on their
own financial resources during retirement,
and it will be weakest in economies where
the elderly rely on transfers from their
adult children or the government.
NTA provides useful data on the role
of assets as a source of support for the
elderly in a wide range of economic
settings. Apart from labor income, the
elderly rely on three sources of support
to fund their consumption: on public
transfers, including pensions and publicly
funded healthcare less taxes; on private
transfers, typically from younger family
members, less transfers that the elderly
make to their families; and on assets,
which include real assets such as farms,
businesses, and homes, and financial
assets such as stocks, bonds, mutual
funds, publicly and privately funded
pensions, and personal savings.
Analysis of NTA data shows that
sources of old-age support are extra-
ordinarily diverse (Figure 10). In Europe
and Latin America, public transfer systems,
including pensions and publicly funded
healthcare, provide about two-thirds of
the consumption needs of the elderly. In
Brazil, Austria, Sweden, and Hungary, the
elderly rely almost exclusively on public
transfers.
Within Asia, private transfers are
important in China, Thailand, Taiwan,
and South Korea, but not in Japan. In
those economies lying along the right side
of the triangle in Figure 10, net private
transfers are close to zero. In those lying
outside the triangle to the right, the
elderly actually give more to their children
and their grandchildren than they receive.
The extent to which the elderly rely
on assets for support varies widely. In
several economies, assets fund from one-
to two-thirds of their lifecycle deficit. In a
few economies, including the United States,
the elderly are even more reliant on assets.
One surprising feature of these results
is that in low-income economies where
public transfer systems are poorly developed,
the elderly rely more on assets than on
transfers from their children. A number
of considerations should be kept in mind,
however. First, these patterns are strongly
influenced by groups with the most
income. Second, the elderly who are
poor undoubtedly have few assets, but
they also have children who can provide
little support. Third, in situations where
the elderly tend to live with their adult
children, it is inherently difficult to deter-
mine whether they are relying on their
children (and their labor income) for sup-
port or whether the children are relying
on their elderly parents (and assets they
accumulated during their working years).
In considering the relative merits of
transfers versus assets as sources of support
for the elderly, Lee and Mason argued that
higher saving will lead to greater investment,
to higher productivity and wages, and to
higher standards of living (Lee, Mason,
and Miller 2003). In the right circum-
stances, they contended, the increased
saving and investment that accompany
population aging will lead to a “second
demographic dividend.” In addition to
benefits for the domestic economy, an
increase in the demand for assets may also
lead to higher demand for foreign assets,
supporting productivity gains in the
receiving economies.
Detlef Kotte, Heiner Flassbeck, and
Michael Herrmann, on the other hand,
contended that higher saving rates do
not necessarily lead to higher productive
investment. Investment can be financed
through expansionary monetary policy,
and saving can be the result of investment
rather than the other way around. They
emphasized that higher saving can reduce
consumption of—and demand for—
goods and services, which could discour-
age investment, slow output growth, and
have a negative effect on employment.
The result would be to weaken the
capacity of the working-age population to
support a larger number of dependents.
The big question is whether the assets
that people accumulate are actually invested
productively: What are governments and
private institutions doing with the money
that people are saving? Are they making
investments that will promote economic
growth, raise worker productivity, and
sustain high employment rates in the
future?
Thus the participants did not agree
on one important question: Whether
higher saving or higher consumption is
better for economic growth. They did
agree on two other points, however. First,
increasing saving in the midst of a deep
recession is ill-advised and is very unlikely
to lead to more rapid economic growth.
And second, creating a favorable invest-
ment environment is essential to meeting






























Figure 10. The old-age support system: Public transfers, family transfers, and
asset-based flows as a proportion of the lifecycle deficit (gap between consump-
tion and labor income) at age 65 and above in 17 economies in a recent year.
Source:Mason and Lee 2011.
Note: See Table 1 for country designations. Light blue dots are for South and Southeast Asia; dark blue
dots are for Latin America; light green dots are for Europe and the United States; and dark green dots
are for East Asia.
The impact of population aging on
pensions and healthcare systems
Populations today are aging at very differ-
ent rates, and the pension and healthcare
systems that serve them also differ widely
in terms of design and coverage. Over the
next decades, there may be some saving in
healthcare and education as the number
of children diminishes. But many
economies will face fiscal pressure as the
number of taxpayers who fund public
programs declines relative to the number
of elderly who rely on pensions and
healthcare benefits. Rob Vos showed that
the combined costs of pensions and
healthcare programs are projected to
increase over the next 50 years in 10
European economies and decline, only
slightly, in one (Figure 11).
Economic growth generally leads to
increases in tax revenues that can be used
to support pension and healthcare pro-
grams. But program costs are also likely
to rise with economic development.
Six main factors will determine the
level of aggregate expenditures:
 Changes in population age structure
that influence eligibility for benefits
and the utilization of publicly funded
goods and services
 The proportion of the population
that is covered by pension and health-
care systems
 The generosity of the benefits provided
 Prices of goods and services, particularly
in healthcare
 Technological developments that affect
costs and the demand for healthcare
 Regulations and inefficiency that
influence administrative costs
Richard Hinz showed that pension
coverage is closely correlated with eco-
nomic development (Figure 12), and he
speculated that coverage by healthcare
systems probably follows a similar pattern.
Hinz presented research that he conducted
with Asta Zviniene projecting aggregate
expenditures on pension and healthcare
benefits for four scenarios over the next
60 years. Their model is designed to
illuminate the consequences of expected
demographic and economic trends, both
with pension and healthcare programs
unchanged and with specific policy
adjustments.
The first scenario represents high-
income economies with relatively old
populations and mature pension and
healthcare systems. These tend to have
very high coverage rates. Virtually all
workers are contributing, and virtually
all of the elderly are receiving benefits.
Examples include Japan, Australia, New
Zealand, Canada, the US, and most
European economies.
The second scenario describes economies
that are experiencing population aging along
with rapid economic growth. These include
the “Asian Tigers”—South Korea, Taiwan,
Brunei, and Singapore. Their pension and
healthcare systems are relatively immature.
The third scenario represents low-
income economies with much younger
populations, such as those of Africa,
South and Southeast Asia, and parts of
Latin America. These economies have
generally introduced pension and health-
care systems quite recently, and coverage
tends to be low.
The fourth scenario describes middle-
income economies—such as China,
Malaysia, Chile, Mexico, and Russia.
These economies are beginning with the
low coverage and low levels of benefits
characteristic of low-income settings but
have populations that are aging as rapidly
as in many high-income economies.
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Figure 11. Projected changes in budget costs related to population aging
in 11 european economies as a percentage of GDP, 2010–2060.
Source: Rob Vos, presentation at the Technical Policy Seminar on the Economics of Aging.
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Figure 12. Pension coverage and per capita GDP.
Source: OECD andWorld Bank 2009.
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Pension systems
Hinz and Zviniene’s model suggests that
if the effective retirement age remains at
60 and current benefit formulas remain
unchanged, economies at every level of
development will experience significantly
higher costs. High-income economies
with mature systems could see the share
of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
allocated to pensions triple by 2070, from
5 percent to 16 percent, due primarily to
changes in population age structure. Newly
high-income economies with rapidly
aging populations could experience an
even faster rate of cost increase—driven
by population aging, expansion of cover-
age, and income growth—moving from
2 percent to 16 percent of GDP.
Lower-income economies could
experience the dual impact of rising
incomes and expanding coverage, also
resulting in steep cost increases from 2
percent to 14 percent of GDP. Middle-
income economies could experience cost
increases from 4 percent to 16 percent of
GDP, due to population aging as well as
expanding coverage.
Not all participants in the seminar
agreed that rising pension costs are a
problem, noting that pension systems do
not represent costs as such, but are merely
channels to redistribute resources. Never-
theless, Hinz and Zviniene modify their
simulation to illustrate how pension costs
can be reduced by policy adjustments.
These modifications show that:
 Raising effective retirement ages from
60 to 65 would have only a modest
effect on costs. Longer periods of
work, however, would produce higher
revenues for pension systems that
would help to alleviate fiscal pressures.
In addition, the resulting increase in
labor supply could potentially raise
the level of GDP.
 Indexing pensions by price rather
than by wages after the initial level
of benefits is established at retirement,
when combined with an increase in
retirement age, could reduce the level
of projected expenditures by nearly
one-half.
The simulation results suggest that in
some settings the design and evolution of
pension-system parameters is potentially
as important as the underlying changes in
population age structure in determining
future costs. Adjustments in benefits will
be particularly critical in low-income
settings where current individual-level
benefits tend to be high—as much as 135
percent of per capita GDP, compared with
33 percent in high-income economies.
Using data from high-income
economies, Mauricio Soto demonstrated
the tradeoffs between three approaches
to pension reform: curtailing eligibility
(e.g., by increasing the retirement age),
reducing benefits (for example, by index-
ing benefits to prices rather than wages),
and increasing contributions (Figure 13).
With no increases in payroll taxes and no
cuts in benefits, average statutory retire-
ment ages would have to increase by
about 2.5 years over the next 20 years to
keep spending on pensions constant in
relation to GDP. Relying only on benefit
reductions would require an average 15-
percent across-the-board cut in pensions,
while relying only on increased contribu-
tions would require an average rate hike
of 2.8 percentage points.
To keep pension spending as a share
of GDP from rising after 2030, additional
reforms would be needed. For each decade,
retirement age would have to increase by
about one year, benefits would have to be
cut by about 6 percent, or contribution
rates would have to be increased by about
1 percentage point. Policymakers who
wish to control pension costs need to
assess how the various policy options
would affect fairness and equity and
determine the optimal approach for each
economic setting.
Comparing data from 19 economies
at widely different stage of development,
Sang-Hyop Lee observed that raising the
normal retirement age will have a limited
effect in low-income economies, where
many of the elderly continue to work but
where their earnings are low. With eco-
nomic development, workers tend to
retire early, and raising the eligibility age
for pensions triggers only a small increase
in the actual average retirement age. In
assessing the effects of pension policies
on saving rates, Lee found that decreasing
pension benefits produces a much larger
increase in saving than raising the age at
which workers are eligible to receive a
pension.
Another option for pension reform
involves switching from a “pay-as-you-go”
or “paygo” system, in which retirees receive
pensions that are funded by the current
contributions of younger people who are
still working, to fully or partially funded
systems, in which pension benefits are
based on the earlier contributions made
by the individual retiree. This amounts to
a shift from public transfers toward more
reliance on assets. Indeed, a funded pen-
sion system functions as a type of saving
plan that could, potentially, lead to
productive investments in the economy.
Heiner Flassbeck described a crisis
situation for the pay-as-you-go pension
system in Kazakstan in the late 1990s
(Hoffmann et al. 2001). At that time,
workers were paying 25 percent of wages
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Figure 13. Trade-offs between three approaches to pension reform:
raising the retirement age, reducing benefits, and increasing contributions.
Source:Mauricio Soto, presentation at the Technical Policy Seminar on the Economics of Aging.
Based on IMF 2012 (forthcoming).
rate was 20 percent and the government
owed US$600 million in pension arrears.
In response, the Kazakstan government
chose to shift to a fully funded pension
system.
To improve the financial status of a
pension system, Flassbeck recommends:
(1) raising the age of retirement; (2) using
general taxes to finance disability, survivors’,
and social pensions; (3) abolishing unjus-
tified entitlements; and (4) introducing
individually identifiable contributions.
Any of these measures can be introduced
within the framework of a pay-as-you-go
system.
In the case of Kazakstan, he predicted
that switching to a fully funded pension
system would add considerably to admin-
istrative costs and would contribute little
or nothing to capital investment because
most of the pension funds would be
invested in government bonds. When
changing from a pay-as-you-go to a fully
or partially funded system, the question is:
Does additional saving lead to productive
investment or not? If not, then changing
the system does not help and may even
make the situation worse.
Michael Hermann pointed out that
fully funded pension systems may increase
income inequality. Because they are based
on long-term returns to investment, they
may also be less reliable than pay-as-you-
go systems. To minimize risk, pension
funds often invest in government bonds,
so in terms of investment, they are not all
that different from pay-as-you go systems
that are also backed by governments.
Jorge Bravo agreed that in some cases,
such as Kazakstan, switching to a funded
pension system has not resulted in greater
national saving or investment. Another
example is the Argentinean pension
system, whose funds were nationalized in
2009 and transferred to a state-managed
pay-as-you-go system.
A well-managed pension fund, how-
ever, can make a positive contribution to
national saving, investment, and growth.
One example is Chile. As is often the
case, when Chile’s pension system was
reformed, a large proportion (more than
40 percent in 1983) of the fund was
initially invested in public debt. By the
late 2000s, however, public instruments
had declined to less than 10 percent of the
fund as opportunities to invest elsewhere
opened up.
Although it is difficult to disentangle
causal effects, there is little doubt that
after Chile’s funded system was intro-
duced national saving and investment
grew significantly. Chile’s pension fund
has become a major institutional investor,
holding large shares of private-sector
stocks and bonds, and a major supplier
of medium- and long-term financing,
including more than 40 percent of
mortgages in the country. Because of
other problems—such as limited coverage
among low-income workers—the system
was reformed in 2008 to introduce uni-
versal and minimum benefits.
Turning to another issue, David
Canning reported on a study in 40 high-
and middle-income economies designed
to assess whether pension reform actually
influences people to retire later. In every
economy there is a trend for people to save
more and retire earlier as their incomes
increase. The optimal response to a longer
healthy lifespan, however, would be to
work longer. His findings show that
pension systems that specify a young
retirement age and provide generous
benefits often lead to early retirement and
low levels of saving. A package of reforms
that includes removing incentives to retire
early and switching to a fully or partially
funded system can reverse this trend.
Healthcare systems
Projections of future expenditures on
healthcare are more complicated than
projections of pension costs. The effects
of demographic change interact with the
expansion of access to healthcare that
generally accompanies economic growth,
with age-related patterns of healthcare
utilization, and with the relationship
of healthcare consumption to income
(healthcare as a “luxury good”). Based on
observations in a variety of settings, Hinz
and Zviniene’s model assumes that health-
care spending increases by 1.28 percent
for every 1-percent increase in GDP.
Population aging and expanded access
alone can lead to rising healthcare costs
similar to those for pensions, with changes
from the current situation much larger in
low-income settings. But if healthcare
consumption in today’s low-income
economies increases with aging and with
rising incomes more rapidly that GDP, as
it has in high-income settings, then the
aggregate costs of healthcare could soon
become a very large share of economic
output, reaching as high as 34 percent of
GDP. Together, healthcare and pension
costs could equal as much as one-half of
economic output within 60 years if there
is no change in the generosity of programs
or benefit formulas.
Tim Miller observed that Hinz and
Zviniene’s forecasts for pension systems
in middle-income economies match well
with data for Latin American economies
that have not undertaken pension reform.
The model for healthcare, however,
projects much higher costs that currently
predicted for Latin America (Figure 14).
Over the next 40 years, Miller and his
colleagues estimate that healthcare costs
will increase from 1.6 times in Uruguay
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Figure 14. Health expenditures as a share of GDP: ratio of projected share
in 2050 to that of 2010 for 10 Latin American economies, compared with
Hinz and Zviniene’s model.
Source: TimMiller, written contribution to the Technical Policy Seminar on the Economics of Aging.
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to 2.7 times in Cuba. This is similar to
the results of Hinz and Zviniene’s model
that include aging and access only, but
not rising consumption that results in cost
inflation. These comparisons suggest
that: (1) In middle-income economies,
expenditures on pensions and healthcare
could double or triple relative to GDP;
and (2) the fiscal impact of population
aging is highly sensitive to policy reform.
Several speakers addressed the issue
of rapidly escalating healthcare costs. All
would agree on the importance of keeping
costs under control by avoiding unjustified
expenditures that are not linked to im-
provements in healthcare services. And
no one would argue in favor of limiting
expansion of the healthcare sector as long
as it actually delivers more healthcare
while contributing to higher employment,
income, and economic growth. If people
choose to spend a larger proportion of
their resources on healthcare as they
become wealthier and older, this will
require structural change in the economy,
but it is not, in itself, a source of concern.
Three policy issues arise, however.
The first is that people may not actually
be choosing to spend more on healthcare;
rather, they may end up spending more
as a distortion of priorities because they
often do not pay for healthcare them-
selves. The second issue is that funding
larger health sectors through higher taxes
could undermine work or investment
incentives.
The third issue concerns the ineffi-
ciency of many healthcare systems. David
Canning argued that healthcare systems in
many economies could potentially provide
high levels of health at much lower costs
than they do today. Particularly large
gains could be achieved in the US. He
described the potential cost savings that
could be achieved by improving efficiency,
without lowering the care provided, as the
“good news” about healthcare.
Mauricio Soto estimated the average
impact of five types of reform on public
healthcare spending in 2030 as a percent
of GDP: budget caps (including budget
constraints and central government
oversight); public management and
coordination (including “gatekeeping”
processes that require referrals for accessing
specialized care and subnational government
involvement); market mechanisms
(including choice of insurers and
providers, private provision, and the
ability of insurers to compete); demand-
side reforms (including expansion of
private insurance and cost sharing); and
supply controls (including regulation of
the healthcare workforce) (Figure 15).
The impact of these simulated reforms
appears to be modest. They might well fall
short of what would be needed to stabilize
public-healthcare-spending-to-GDP ratios
at moderate levels. This suggests that addi-
tional efforts may be needed to stabilize
spending, or fiscal adjustments might be
introduced that rely on cuts in other areas
or increases in revenue.
It is important to note that the possible
savings linked to various reforms are
subject to uncertainty. Some reforms
could be complementary, implying that
the savings under any particular reform
may be understated. But simultaneous
reforms across different aspects of the
health system might also be undesirable
or counterproductive. Thus, the effect of
the reforms across categories depicted in
Figure 15 cannot necessarily be aggregated.
In discussing healthcare for Japan’s
aging population, Naohiro Ogawa empha-
sized a demographic change that goes
beyond fiscal constraints. As in other East
Asian economies, elderly Japanese tradi-
tionally lived with their adult children
and were cared for by their middle-aged
daughters or daughters-in-law. In 1950,
there were 31 women in Japan age 40–59
for every elderly person age 80 and above;
in 2010, there were only three. Given this
demographic reality, more of the elderly
will inevitably be cared for in institutions.
This transition from a home-based to a
market-based system will make the costs
of long-term care for the elderly more
readily measurable and possibly very
high.
Using the multibillion-dollar health-
care industry as an example, Michael
Herrmann proposed that the macro-
economic impact of population aging
can be most appropriately understood as
a process of structural change (Herrmann
2011). This process will create winners
and losers among firms and will impose
transitory costs on some workers, but it
will not necessarily have a negative impact
on economies as a whole.
Expansion of the healthcare industry
can provide attractive investment oppor-
tunities, employment opportunities, and
labor income. If markets function well,
they should respond efficiently to these
changes in demand and supply. Thus
from a macro-economic perspective,
Herrmann contended that it is not
meaningful to say that healthcare expen-
ditures amount to a cost within GDP.
Rather, everything in a macro economy































Figure 15. Average impact of reform components on health spending by 2030:
Decrease relative to the baseline as a percent of GDP.
Source:Mauricio Soto, presentation at the Technical Policy Seminar on the Economics of Aging.
Based on OECD Health Database and IMF staff estimates.
Note: Unweighted averages of the impact of reforms.
Future directions
This seminar provided a useful opportunity
to present findings from the NTA project
to an audience of economists in academic
institutions and United Nations agencies.
Further presentations and discussion
highlighted important policy concerns
from multiple perspectives. Much of the
discussion focused on the macro-economic
effects of population aging, including
structural changes in markets and the
impact of older populations on patterns
of saving and investment. The participants
also discussed the impact of population
aging on pension and healthcare systems,
including forecasts of the level of fiscal
pressure that can be expected and the pros
and cons of various approaches to contain
costs. These include:
 Relaxing mandatory retirement
provisions
 Investing in education and health as
fertility declines
 Indexing pension benefits to changes
in prices rather than wages
 Switching from pay-as-you-go to
partly or fully funded pension systems
 Reducing inefficiencies in the delivery
of healthcare
Tim Miller mentioned that several
groups have produced long-term forecasts
of pension and healthcare costs. He sug-
gested that it might be useful to ask various
teams to produce models for comparison
based on a common set of inputs.
In closing the seminar, Jose Miguel
Guzman commented that much of the
discussion concerned issues of population
aging in high-income economies. He
looks forward to another technical policy
seminar on the economic effects of popu-
lation aging that focuses on the problems
facing developing economies.
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